28 August 2012

Apple vs Samsung

Here is an article from wsj that at least someone from the states is telling the truth.


Apple's Lawsuit Sent a Message to Google

Last week Apple made headlines twice. On Monday it broke the world record for shareholder value. Apple's $623.5 billion market cap beat Microsoft's record from tech's notorious bubble era. (Microsoft needed a price-to-earnings ratio of 72 in 1999 to set the record. Apple's ratio is a modest 16.) Then on Friday, Apple won a $1.05 billion patent-infringement judgment against Samsung, the Korean electronics giant and the maker of the Galaxy line of smartphones that stirred Apple's ire.
Congratulations, Apple—twice. But these two coinciding events should give us pause.
One, how badly has Apple been hurt by copycats if it has become the richest company on earth? Do we want a patent system in which the strongest sue everyone else? Is this good for innovation?
Two, Apple lost the jury trial, in a federal court in San Jose, Calif., on most of its hardware claims, such as a ridiculous patent on curved glass for phone surface design. Apple won mostly on software, such as "pinch and stretch," a nifty design trick Apple introduced in 2007 with its first iPhone. So why did Apple sue Samsung, the Galaxy hardware manufacturer, and not Google, maker of the phone's Android software?
Apple sees Google as its chief competitor—this is no secret. Steve Jobs so hated Google's Android that, even as he struggled with cancer, he told biographer Walter Isaacson: "Google . . . ripped off the iPhone, wholesale ripped us off. I will spend my last dying breath if I need to, and I will spend every penny of Apple's $40 billion in the bank, to right this wrong. I'm going to destroy Android, because it's a stolen product. . . . I'm willing to go thermonuclear on this."
It is revealing that Jobs spent precious energy in such an outburst. As a longtime Silicon Valley observer, I believe the real story is not what it seems. The source of Jobsian rage was not his Google loathing, per se. It was fear that Apple might be "Microsofted" again.
Some history: As many people know by now, Apple founder Steve Jobs and Macintosh computer designer Bill Atkinson drew heavily from the work of Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center. In the 1970s, PARC had developed a computer called Alto. The computer featured all kinds of new stuff, including a mouse and pop-up windows. Jobs visited PARC in 1979 and a light switched on. A day or two later, Jobs met with an industrial designer and ordered him to build a prototype computer with a mouse. Thus was born the Apple Macintosh, which made its debut in 1984.
Did Apple steal from Xerox PARC or not? In the broadest sense, yes. The visit to PARC did more than inspire Steve Jobs. It sent him directly on a mission to build something very much like the Alto. But Jobs being Jobs, he immediately had ideas for improvement. The mouse should have one button, not three. It should work on any surface. It should be cheap to manufacture. The pop-up windows should look this way, not that way.
Jobs swiped the idea and made it better. But Macintosh was only modestly successful in the market, and Jobs was asked to leave Apple in 1985.
Meanwhile, his baby-boomer rival, Bill Gates, had introduced Microsoft Windows software in 1983. It wasn't pretty, and it didn't work well until version three in 1986, two years after the Macintosh's arrival. But it incorporated several Apple features, and the personal-computer industry built around Windows software soon boomed and grew to immense size. Microsoft PCs crushed the Macintosh market share, which fell to 3% by the late 1990s.
In the mind of Steve Jobs, I believe, the story was this: Even if he did copy the idea of the Xerox Alto, he added so much value that the copying barely amounted to technological petty larceny; Microsoft, by contrast, just ripped off Apple without improving it.
What Bill Gates improved, of course, was not Apple's software but the entire business model for personal computing. That's how Microsoft came to dominate personal computing for a generation. That's how Microsoft beat the market-cap world record and held it until Apple topped it nearly 13 years later.
Jobs deeply feared a replay of this business-model history. He feared that Google was going to pull a Microsoft and once again reduce Apple's products to a pricey niche. To Jobs, Android looked like the new Windows.
So why doesn't Apple sue Google directly, instead of suing a Google hardware partner like Samsung? Politics and public relations, mainly. Apple knows that suing a foreign giant will go down a lot better than suing a Silicon Valley neighbor. Apple enjoys huge favor right now among customers, politicians and the public. Suing Google would divide Apple's support and tarnish the company's image. So Apple sued a foreign company to send a message to Google.
This techno-Shakespearian story is entertaining but is bad for the phone-buying public. (Tablet patents were also part of the Apple-Samsung court case, but smartphones were at the heart of the lawsuit.) As Samsung contemplates filing an appeal, it appears that smartphone-makers may begin redesigning their products to avoid crossing swords with Apple.
Last week I bought a Samsung Galaxy Note phone. It is a marvel of machinery. It is larger, slimmer and lighter than Apple's iPhone. The Samsung Note's screen is so large that people who see it think I must have acquired an early version of the mini-iPad that Apple is expected to release soon. The Note takes the iPhone hardware design and makes it significantly better.
Funny. That's just what Apple did with the Xerox Alto.
Mr. Karlgaard is the publisher of Forbes.

23 August 2012

Dow breakthrough

Do you believe insider trading can be prevented?

The Fed emphasizes their meeting minutes be kept confidential till about 3 weeks before they are released.

The Fed meetings website is below:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm

The recent meeting 31July/1Aug minutes released yesterday should indicate QE3 coming pretty soon and if they are kept really confidential with no insider trading then the Dow should have a sudden break upside yesterday, but it didnt.

Why? Check below.

The recent low is 12778 on 2Aug , the recent high is 13330 [21Aug], smart readers should be able to draw conclusion from here and position themselves accordingly.

The Dow details [source Yahoo, rounded] are listed below:

Date  Open   High   Low   Close   Volume 
21-Aug-12    13,272    13,331    13,187    13,204  1,170,600
20-Aug-12    13,275    13,276    13,230    13,272     875,900
17-Aug-12    13,251    13,281    13,245    13,275  1,385,500
16-Aug-12    13,163    13,269    13,146    13,250  1,145,800
15-Aug-12    13,157    13,193    13,138    13,165     771,300
14-Aug-12    13,168    13,223    13,142    13,172     844,300
13-Aug-12    13,205    13,205    13,113    13,169     675,500
10-Aug-12    13,163    13,208    13,095    13,208     866,400
09-Aug-12    13,175    13,200    13,125    13,165     843,500
08-Aug-12    13,158    13,203    13,115    13,176     849,100
07-Aug-12    13,119    13,216    13,118    13,169     952,400
06-Aug-12    13,100    13,187    13,100    13,118     842,700
03-Aug-12    12,885    13,133    12,885    13,096  1,123,900
02-Aug-12    12,970    12,970    12,779    12,879  1,127,700 

21 August 2012

You Bought. They Sold

One reason why ordinary amateur investors keep on losing money in the stock market is depicted in detail by the article below.

But you can also piggy back on their tails by spending more time on charts which give you an idea where the smart money is heading. You wont outsmart them, yet you can still get some decent returns.

For those of you who want to know the power of charts should read the earlier part of this blog esp sections on HSBC.



You Bought. They Sold
All over corporate America, top execs were cashing in stock even as their companies were tanking. Who was left holding the bag? You.
By Mark Gimein Reporter Associates Eric Dash, Lisa Munoz, Jessica Sung
September 2, 2002
(FORTUNE Magazine) – Over the past months, the public has been treated to an ever-lengthening parade of corporate villains, each seemingly more rapacious than the last. First there were the Enronites, led by the now disgraced Kenneth Lay, Fifth-Amendmenting their way through the halls of Congress. Then there was Global Crossing's Gary Winnick, with his Drexel Burnham resume and hundreds of miles of useless undersea cables. And of course there was Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski, who, despite having made hundreds of millions of dollars from Tyco stock options, stands accused by the government of shipping empty boxes out of New York to avoid the sales tax--the sales tax!--on his million-dollar paintings.
These people and a handful of others are the poster children for the "infectious greed" that Fed chairman Alan Greenspan described recently to Congress. But by now, with the feverish flush of the new economy recognizable as a symptom not of a passion but of an illness, it has also become clear that the mores and practices that characterize this greed suffused the business world far beyond Enron and Tyco, Adelphia and WorldCom.
With assistance from Thomson Financial and the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Securities Pricing, FORTUNE set out to answer an obvious question: As Lay, Winnick, Kozlowski, et al. were dumping their shares and getting rich, what were the rest of America's top executives doing? Gary Winnick, we all now know, sold some $735 million in stock as his company was hurtling toward bankruptcy. But was this really the ultimate in millennial avarice?
In a word: no.
The not-so-secret dirty secret of the crash is that even as investors were losing 70%, 90%, even in some cases all of their holdings, top officials of many of the companies that have crashed the hardest were getting immensely, extraordinarily, obscenely wealthy. They got rich because they were able to take advantage of the bubble to cash in hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of stock--stock that was usually handed to them via risk-free options--at vastly inflated prices. When the bubble burst, their shareholders were left holding the bag. But, hey, they had theirs.
How much did they take in? We'll get to that in a second, but first we need to explain the criteria for the list that accompanies this story. First, we looked at companies that had hit a market cap of at least $400 million--and fallen by at least 75% from the highs they reached during the bubble years. Second, we counted insider stock sales from 1999 onward. (That's why Gary Winnick's tally comes to "only" $508 million on our list; he had sold a ton of Global Crossing stock before 1999.) And third, we included only stock sold by top executives and board members; the quick profits made by the venture capital firms that funded the dot-com boom were excluded. (Also excluded in all but a very few cases--largely because it's impossible to track--was stock sold by company officers after they left their jobs. For the same reason, we did not include the cost of acquiring the shares; in most cases option prices were so low that including that cost would hardly affect the totals.) What we cared about, ultimately, was a simple, straightforward thing: How much cash did the top executives at America's Losingest Companies reap by selling their shares to the investing public?
Even with these fairly narrow parameters, the numbers are astounding. Executives and directors of the 1,035 corporations that met our criteria took out, by our estimate, roughly $66 billion. Of that amount, a total haul of $23 billion went to 466 insiders at the 25 corporations where the executives cashed out the most. Those are the companies that make up this list.
The top 25 include some big and obvious names: Cisco (CEO John Chambers: $239 million), for instance, and AOL Time Warner, parent of FORTUNE's publisher (chairman Steve Case: $475 million). But they also include companies you would be surprised to find on a top-25 list of any kind. Executives and directors at a software maker called Ariba raked in $1.24 billion even as its stock was falling from $150 to around $3. Yahoo executives reaped $901 million in stock sales while the company's shares fell from $250 to about $11. InfoSpace, once touted by its founder, Naveen Jain, as on its way to becoming the first "trillion-dollar" company, makes the list. In early 2000, by which time Jain had already taken out more than $200 million, he protested to FORTUNE that "investors...know I am committed to our long-term success." Now Jain's "trillion-dollar" company has a stock price of around 50 cents and a market cap around $145 million--and meanwhile, its founder has sold an additional $200 million or so. i2 Technologies, which makes supply-chain management software, now has a total market cap that is less than CEO Sanjiv Sidhu's haul of $447 million. Peregrine Systems is a deeply troubled software company that is on its third auditor in six months, has announced that it will restate years of revenues, and faces delisting from Nasdaq. Its stock is below 40 cents. But not to worry. Back before anyone realized that its revenues were misstated, chairman John Moores cashed out $646 million, enough to cover the losses of the San Diego Padres, which he also owns, for the next 85 years.
For the record, the company that tops our list is Qwest Communications, the beleaguered telecom. Company executives took down a staggering $2.26 billion, with then-chairman Phil Anschutz alone selling almost $1.6 billion of stock to BellSouth in May 1999. The price he got, $47.25, was nearly $8 a share above Qwest's market price at the time. Qwest now trades at a little more than $1 a share. Of course, Qwest has also announced that it had inflated its revenues over the past three years.
For an ordinary investor, it is nearly impossible to look at this list and not feel ripped off. In some cases insiders clearly cheated the investment community to realize their gains--by ginning up revenue numbers that have turned out to be phony. But even putting those cases aside, the billions of dollars of insider sales make absurd many of the rationales executives used to justify their new wealth. Take, for instance, the notion that executives were being rewarded for performance. Plainly, the executives on this list did not perform. They failed miserably; in many cases they failed even as they were bragging about how well they were doing and how much their stock would rise.
As for the idea that big stock and options grants would align the interests of shareholders and managers--that now seems equally absurd. What really took place was a breach of faith, with the insiders in effect betraying their shareholders by making sure that they themselves wound up rich no matter how badly things turned out for their companies or their investors.
Not surprisingly, most of the money was taken down at the height of the bubble, during the era of Dow 36,000 and day-trading mania, as a grand speculative fervor swept the country. For too many executives, the easy riches to be made were hugely tempting, and the moral (and sometimes legal) niceties easily ignored. All too often, the people who ran the companies that were the darlings of the bull market saw nothing wrong with taking a seat at the casino, selling high, and cashing out their chips. To put it another way, they got greedy.
To be sure, that wasn't true of everybody. If you look closely at the accompanying list, there are some names you will not find. David Filo, one of the two founders of Yahoo, is not there. Even as Yahoo's top executives sold hundreds of millions of dollars of stock, Filo himself sold nothing. You will also not find Gerald Levin, the former chief executive of AOL Time Warner. Say what you will about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of the AOL Time Warner merger, you can't say that Levin saw it as a shortcut to personal enrichment. He, too, didn't cash in.
It's tempting for some to see a cultural divide between executives of the old economy and the new. But really it's a moral divide between the CEOs and the CEO speculators. "By and large for the people doing it [selling their shares], the financial component of being in those companies outweighed the executive responsibility," says Michael Ramsay, CEO of Tivo, who sold less than $1.6 million of stock.
One of the most cogent explanations of what's wrong with this practice comes, amazingly, from Henry Nicholas, chief executive of Broadcom (No. 2 on the list) and a man who has taken out $799 million even as Broadcom's stock went from a high of $274 a share to around $22. In an interview, Nicholas said that he told his employees, "If you sold your shares to somebody at the top of the market, somebody has bought shares from you. Imagine it's your mother or grandmother--now she's lost half her money." Thinking about whom you're selling to isn't something the market should demand of ordinary shareholders--but isn't it worth considering for a CEO whose job, ultimately, is to make sure his shareholders do well?
Not surprisingly, most of the executives on our list declined to discuss their stock sales. Those who did often professed to be simply oblivious to the issue. "We really provided tremendous value," insisted Keith Krach, chairman of Ariba. His total take: $239 million--with his first sale coming a mere 122 days after Ariba's IPO and two days after the expiration of his unusually short four-month post-IPO lockup.
Says JDS Uniphase CEO Jozef Straus, who sold $147 million in shares within three months of taking the CEO spot in May 2000: "It was done in the middle of the growth market. Everybody was saying that it was going to be moving up for the next five years." Besides, he adds tellingly, "Why would I not sell? I was a shareholder like any other shareholder." Here's InfoSpace founder Naveen Jain: "Nobody believed [InfoSpace's stock] was overpriced. If I did, I would have been selling a lot more." Jain is a particularly egregious case; he actually got his company's underwriters to let him sell shares in a secondary offering before the IPO lockup period had ended.
And what of Henry Nicholas of Broadcom, who sold and sold and sold at prices as high as $260 a share as the bull market ran its course? "I would sit and talk to people [during the boom], and I would ask, 'How do we rationalize any of these valuations?'" he says. "There seemed to be a disconnect. I was sitting there going, 'Wow! Look at these valuations.' But I was also sitting there thinking, Maybe this is a new economy."
"I didn't go to business school," Nicholas adds--implying that he didn't have the market sophistication to understand that we were in a bubble. Now, of course, the investors who bought their shares from him ("Imagine it's your mother or grandmother") have lost well over half their money. But after telling us that he was in no position to know what value was "right" for his stock, he conceded that he had dramatically cut back his selling in 2002. Why? Because the price was "just too low."
It's important to note some caveats. Gateway founder Ted Waitt left Gateway for about a year--and stopped selling shares when he returned to take over the by-then-troubled computer maker. Indeed, he has recently been a buyer of Gateway stock. Others, including Case and Jain, have also bought back shares. Mind you, they've bought in much smaller amounts--and at much lower prices--than they sold: Case announced he was buying $24 million in AOL Time Warner stock, while Jain purchased InfoSpace stock when it got to $4 a share. "Sell high, buy low" doesn't exactly add up to a manifesto of corporate responsibility.
Several others, such as John Malone and Jim Barksdale, wound up on the list because they took board seats at AT&T and AOL, respectively, when their companies were bought. And then there's Jay Walker, who vehemently protested his inclusion on this list. Walker pointed out that he had plowed most of his net worth--$36 million--into starting up Priceline; that he had bought $125 million worth of Priceline stock in November 1999 at a price far above the IPO price; that he had personally lost $264 million in "two privately held startups that were built on my faith in the name-your-own-price concept"--and that he had never "dumped" his shares on small investors. Instead he had sold directly to sophisticated buyers, including Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and Saudi Prince Alwaleed. "I believe," he wrote, "that this differentiates my activities from those of other entrepreneurs and corporate executives who clearly, in hindsight, were simply trying to take the money and run." Point taken.
Still, most of the people on this list did take the money and run--and even now they don't seem to feel too bad about it. Maybe just a little embarrassed. When FORTUNE asked an Ariba spokeswoman whether former CFO Edward Kinsey still had his estate next door to Larry Ellison in Atherton, Calif., the spokeswoman quickly corrected us. The house was "across the street, not next door." And anyway, she explained, Atherton--where Kinsey paid $22 million for an estate--is "really modest."
Perhaps the most honest response came from an officer of a company that just barely missed making our list. "I didn't need the money then, and I don't need the money now," he told FORTUNE. But, he added, "if I'd known there was going to be a witch hunt like this, I'd never have done it."
Look, nobody's saying that founders or CEOs shouldn't have been able to take a little money off the table. But this wasn't a "little" money--$66 billion is a huge sum, and the anger it has generated seems, quite frankly, justified. "It all comes down to your personal set of rules about what being an executive of a company really means," says Tivo's Michael Ramsay. Pace Jozef Straus, executives aren't "just shareholders like any other shareholders." Not even close. 

REPORTER ASSOCIATES Eric Dash, Lisa Munoz, Jessica Sung

20 August 2012

Drought, High Oil Prices is a combination for disaster

Drought and High Oil Prices will give the next 12 months a hard time.

The Jasmine Revolution is probably stirred by high food costs.

The current drought in the USA is well known to all, but if it continues for another year, crop prices will hit all food supplies as corn is a key ingredient for meal feed of pigs and chickens.

The only possibilities that the drought can be pacified are below:
  • Rain is forthcoming in the next few months
  • The Ethanol mandate is suspended temporarily as it is mandated by law in the USA 40% of production must be converted as fuel.
There are reports that North Sea oil production has peaked and will fall in 2013, is this the reason or pending QE3 for the recent spike in oil prices?

High oil prices will crush EU economies hard since euro has fallen 10% already and if input prices are even higher, with their reduced income because of high food and fuel prices, demand in everything has to fall.

16 August 2012

HSI update

We are seeing some strange data coming up from the Hang Seng Index futures' open interest.

Aug OI starts at 91k, it went all the way up to 106k, addition of 15k, but index getting nowhere and is stuck at 20000-20200 for many days, a reversal is likely ie heading south. 18800 is the short term support.

To hedge upside too, one can buy 210 call aside from 190 put, probably a win situation if index moves 600 points one way from here [20100 now] which is very likely.




Spot Mth Next Mth
Open Int
2012 07 24  18,850 18,802 74,766 108,090
2012 07 25  18,850 18,800 118,224 110,442
2012 07 26  18,825 18,771 157,064 120,942
2012 07 27  19,245 19,194 154,150 110,208
2012 07 30  19,547 19,498 84,125 105,700
2012 07 31  19,714 19,623 73,993 91,480
2012 08 01  19,792 19,705 74,445 94,696
2012 08 02  19,630 19,543 63,095 97,677
2012 08 03  19,655 19,564 70,140 97,443
2012 08 06  19,959 19,870 61,205 99,419
2012 08 07  20,013 19,928 54,574 99,803
2012 08 08  20,050 19,961 52,571 100,824
2012 08 09  20,192 20,104 61,907 101,731
2012 08 10  20,164 20,075 58,684 102,840
2012 08 13  20,035 19,950 49,010 104,183
2012 08 14  20,251 20,160 69,601 106,993
2012 08 15  20,077 19,990 60,520 104,900

09 August 2012

FaceBook

an article from Bloomberg Businessweek on FB, it just hit its all time low since IPO in May. in HK IPO shares are locked up at least 6 months and no waiver, how this would happen in the US, I really dont know.

read section in blue with red highlight.


Facebook (FB), you surely know, is now chiefly synonymous with IPO disaster. Brokers and market strategists drop the word alongside “Libor” and “Flash Crash” to explain Mom & Pop’s disenchantment with the market. California says its tax revenue is at risk because of the Silicon Valley company’s stock’s swoon. The social network’s dud IPO has also poked millions of francs of red ink out of UBS (UBS), the biggest Swiss bank.

Facebook shares closed down 4 percent Thursday at another all-time low of $20.04, compared with their May initial offering price of $38, amid ongoing fallout from the company’s underwhelming first earnings report as a public company on July 26. The stock has its show-me work cut out for it just a red flags and obstacles keep popping up. On Wednesday, a couple of senior Facebook executives—Katie Mitic, former director of platform marketing, and Ethan Beard, head of platform partnerships—said they’re leaving to pursue other opportunities. In June, the company’s chief technology officer, Bret Taylor, announced his departure. Facebook’s operating margin and sales growth have both declined. And the number of ads it delivered in the U.S. fell 2 percent last quarter even its daily user count jumped 10 percent, management revealed on last week’s call.

“Ad impressions continued the recent trend of growing more slowly than users as more of our usage is on mobile devices,” said Chief Financial Officer David Ebersman. “This trend is particularly true in markets such as the U.S., where smartphone use is expanding rapidly.” Facebook announced its debut mobile-advertising platform just six months ago.

The social network still carries a not-insignificant market capitalization of $49 billion (down from a peak of $104 billion on its first day of trading) and a price-to-earnings ratio that is at least twice that of rival Google (GOOG), according to Bloomberg data. But as Business Insider’s Henry Blodget explains here and here, concern and confusion over Facebook’s actual share count is not exactly inspiring Dodd & Graham value types.

And as “you bought, they sold” remorse still accompanies the ticker FB, there’s a ton more yet coming to market for sale. On Aug. 16, 271 million “locked-up” shares held by insiders and early investors will be freed up for trading. On Oct. 15, another 249 million shares will be added to the mix—then another 1.32 billion on Nov. 14. And 149 million shares for sale on Dec. 14. Just in time for Christmas stocking stuffing.

Bloomberg Businessweek Senior Writer Farzad covers Wall Street and international finance.

05 August 2012

Wilbur Ross, the Bank Eater

What we learnt now in Oct 2011, the HK market rebound 4000 pts from low point to get to almost even before the Aug/Sep fallout. What we dont really know is a story about Northern Rock of UK has a new investor - who is it? This might have triggered the broad rally and confidence for Wall Street insiders.

Read story below [section in red in particular].

Younger readers should read it in more detail so you know how you can become successful. History does not repeat itself exactly, it does repeat in a different context and with some twists, those who become successful get there not by luck alone but by learning history and how to interpret them in the current context and act accordingly and decisively.

 
Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine

Wilbur Ross, the Bank Eater
By Devin Leonard on January 05, 2012

Early one October morning, Wilbur Ross sits before a dozen or so colleagues at the head of a long table in his Manhattan office, considering in his quiet way the purchase of a business worth more than a billion dollars. Ross, 74, is the chairman of WL Ross & Co., among the largest and most active firms specializing in the purchase of distressed companies; in other words, he is a vulture, albeit a well-dressed one, favoring crisp pinstripe suits and freshly shined shoes.

His investment committee is presenting the final details of the firm’s $1.2 billion bid for Northern Rock, the English bank seized by the British government in 2008 after panicked depositors withdrew their funds. WL Ross is partnering with Richard Branson’s Virgin Money.

“Who is our competition?” asks Pamela Wilson, a WL Ross managing director.

“J.C. Flowers is always our competition on everything,” says Stephen Johnson, one of the firm’s vice-presidents, referring to J. Christopher Flowers, another private equity investor. Johnson adds, “The word at the moment is that he won’t be able to bid on this.”

That leaves the field open for Ross, who describes himself as “a guy who likes to run into burning buildings” and who has been running into a lot of them lately. The committee spends much of its time talking about the need to structure the bid so it won’t embarrass the British government, which has spent an estimated $2.2 billion on the Northern Rock bailout. The firm plans to offer the Cameron administration a slice of the proceeds if it takes the bank public.

Ross himself says little, and when he does, he does so in his characteristic near- whisper. It would not be overstating it to say Ross coos. He scrutinizes a pile of documents before him. From time to time he asks a question. He wants to make sure there will be no last-minute regulatory issues. Finally, he says, “I think we are ready to vote on this.”

On Oct. 25, Virgin and WL Ross make their offer. Three weeks later, the British government accepts it and controversy soon follows. Ed Balls, the Labour Party’s shadow chancellor, assails England’s Conservative Party leaders for taking a loss on the bank. Ross arguably makes matters worse by telling British reporters that he hopes to make a substantial profit—unless, of course, Northern Rock is swamped by the European financial crisis that enabled him to buy it so cheaply in the first place. This is a familiar scenario these days. Ross stands to make a lot, if he doesn’t lose even more. 

Since 2008, Ross has invested $1.8 billion in faltering banks, a major play by a high-profile player. Ross is an investor’s investor; he’s not a household name like Warren Buffett or a constant presence on the cable channels like Pimco’s Bill Gross, but he’s revered and followed in his field. “He’s charming, and he’s smart,” says Steven Kaplan, a professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. “And he has been brilliant and contrarian in discerning opportunities.” He is also worth an estimated $2.1 billion, according to Forbes.
His firm was one of four private equity groups that paid $900 million for the failed BankUnited, a large Florida thrift, purchasing it from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in May 2009. He has taken stakes in ailing institutions such as Oregon’s Cascade Bancorp (CACB), New Jersey’s Sun Bancorp (SNBC), and the union-owned Amalgamated Bank in New York, all of which required his financial aid after writing down bad real estate loans. Ross has also looked abroad for bargains—and not just in England. In July he and four other investors spent $1.6 billion to buy 35 percent of the Bank of Ireland (IRE).

In the U.S., Ross argues that the smaller banks he has bought will outperform their larger competitors, such as Bank of America (BAC), which he sees as hobbled by their size and their need to comply with new regulations aimed at the mega banks. Richard Bove, a banking industry analyst, says Ross’s thesis is shrewd: “His timing is pretty good. I would expect he is going to do well.” Indeed, Ross says he and his fellow private equity stakeholders in BankUnited recouped their entire investment when they took the bank public in January 2011.
Across the Atlantic, Ross is buying larger banks. Ross says the plan for Northern Rock is to combine the traditional bank’s 75 branches with Virgin Money’s Internet operations. It’s a good strategy, says Howard Wheeldon, a senior strategist at BGC Partners (BGCP) in London. However, he says, Virgin Money and WL Ross got Northern Rock at a discount because of the inherent economic risks.

Ross says he paid 36 percent of book value for his stake in the Bank of Ireland, which he considers a steal. He believes Ireland will be among the first of the European countries to recover from the euro crisis and applauds its citizens for supporting austerity without taking to the streets: “There have been no riots, no picketing, no car burnings, no nothing.”

Naturally, some question Ross’s bank-buying spree. The Irish government announced in December that the country’s gross domestic product declined 1.9 percent in last year’s third quarter compared with the one before, the worst drop since early 2009. “The figures put a dent in hopes that Ireland was starting to reap the rewards of its economic reforms and austerity measures,” says Jonathan Loynes of Capital Economics in London.

Unlike Northern Rock, Bank of Ireland still holds many of its bad loans. Chief Executive Officer Richie Boucher says the bank passed a stress test conducted by the Irish central bank in March and started selling its problem loans before other euro-zone banks. “We decided to set up our stall at the fair pretty early,” he says. “There’s a couple of guys who are only starting to build their sheds.” It’s a good line, but it’s hardly comforting if the best the Bank of Ireland CEO can say is that his institution is in a slightly better position than banks in Continental Europe.
Stephen Kinsella, a lecturer in economics at the University of Limerick, finds Ross’s acquisition of the Bank of Ireland baffling. “The bank is in deep trouble,” he says. “It’s interesting that some vulture fund would want a stake in it. This is for all intents and purposes a zombie bank.” For his part, Ross is used to doubters. In 2003, when he was buying shuttered steel mills, Businessweek asked: “Is Wilbur Ross crazy?”

“My wife still isn’t sure that question has been adequately answered,” he says.
“We have some new jewelry on display, and I don’t want you to miss it,” says John Loring, the former design director at Tiffany (TIF). “It has no equal anywhere in the world—like the people in this room.” Nearly a hundred fashionable guests are gathered on the second floor of Tiffany’s flagship store on Fifth Avenue in New York for a party celebrating New York New York, a book of portraits by former Life photographer Harry Benson. Ross’s third wife, the social columnist Hilary Geary Ross, wrote the text. Many of Benson’s subjects are present, such as KKR (KKR) Chairman Henry Kravis, designer Tommy Hilfiger, writer Erica Jong, and News Corp. (NWSA) CEO Rupert Murdoch’s spouse, Wendi Deng, who in the book is captured lounging on a sofa in a short, translucent dress.

Ross, who is bald and slightly stooped, bears a certain resemblance to Charles Montgomery Burns, the billionaire tycoon on The Simpsons. His face seems to coalesce naturally into a look of profound skepticism. He’s actually quite sunny. Ross and his wife are fixtures on the New York social circuit, and he often celebrates powerful friends with customized doggerel that jokes about their wealth and, in some cases, their trophy wives. “It’s nice to know that he can get/the senior rate on any jet,” Ross wrote in honor of the 60th birthday of Roberto de Guardiola, an investment banker. “And then to cope with aging’s ills/how about some bright blue pills?”

“He has a great sense of humor,” says his close friend, Richard LeFrak, the New York real estate developer, who has invested in banks with Ross.
Ross stands with his elbow on a jewelry case, sipping a glass of red wine. “I thought this would be good for you to see,” he tells me. “It’s another side of me.”
Many of the revelers pay their respects. “I just read about your latest deal,” gushes a woman with whom Ross exchanges air kisses. “You are so humble. It’s rare for people in your field.” Ross looks delighted to hear it.

“The thing about Wilbur is, he keeps it all up here,” says Cary Thompson, vice-chairman of investment banking at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, pointing to his head. “You go to other buyout shops, and you’re talking to 20 different people.”
“I’m always happy to be seated next to him at a dinner party,” says author Amy Fine Collins, who covers style and fashion for Vanity Fair. “He’s a lot of fun.”
Ross disappears in the crowd and returns with interior designer Mario Buatta, “the prince of chintz,” whose clients include Barbara Walters and Mariah Carey. “I’ve done all his apartments in New York, Southampton, and Palm Beach,” Buatta says. “He’s great to work with as long as you get it done on time.” He gazes around the room at the other guests. “They’re all like that,” he sighs.
“He’s one of the best bottom feeders in the business!” says Leonard Stern, the billionaire real estate mogul.

“I only told him good things about you,” he says to Ross. “You owe me 50 bucks.”
“How ’bout 25?” says Ross.

“Forty,” says Stern.

“Thirty,” says Ross.

Ross grew up in North Bergen, N.J., the son of a municipal judge. He went to Xavier High School, a Jesuit military academy in Manhattan, where he was captain of the rifle squad. He never wore earplugs and damaged his hearing. He hoped to become a writer but found he wasn’t suited for the craft early on at Yale University. “Every single morning, you had to deposit 1,000 words of creative writing into a little mail chute,” Ross recalls. “I found that after three weeks, I was totally out of material.”

He discovered his true calling during a summer stint at a money management firm in New York. He spent hours at the public library researching companies and found that he loved it. “I’ve always been a bit of a bookworm,” he says. After earning an MBA at Harvard Business School in 1961, Ross got a job at Wood Struthers & Winthrop, another Wall Street money manager. He was given the task of salvaging the company’s troubled venture capital investments, such as its bet on a startup founded by an entrepreneur who thought he could make world-changing transistors from cellulose. (He couldn’t.) It forced Ross to learn how to deal with banks, creditors, and Chapter 11 proceedings.

These skills helped when Ross got a job at boutique investment bank Rothschild in 1976. There, he created a niche for himself as a bankruptcy adviser. When the junk bond market collapsed in the late 1980s, he helped bondholders recover their investments in Donald Trump’s Taj Mahal and T. Boone Pickens’s Mesa Petroleum. His office is full of cut-glass tombstones commemorating such deals.
Ross made enough money to underwrite an unsuccessful 1998 campaign to become governor of New York by his second wife, Betsy McCaughey. Their subsequent divorce, however, forced Ross to liquidate his collection of American Pre-Raphaelite paintings. (Ross declines to discuss any aspect of his second marriage.) The nuptial drama came at a time when Ross was becoming restless at Rothschild. It bothered him that he was making tens of millions while his clients were making hundreds of millions. In 2000 he and his entire team (including the mail clerk) departed amicably from Rothschild and formed WL Ross.

It was a good time for talented bottom feeders. The dot-com bubble burst that year and was followed by a recession. Steel companies including Bethlehem Steel filed for bankruptcy. So did textile manufacturer Burlington Industries and mine operator Horizon Natural Resources. Ross snatched them up along with some of their battered competitors. He was able to cut costs by working closely with union leaders. “He had an open mind,” Leo Gerard, international president of the United Steelworkers, says of Ross. “He recognized that workers had more to contribute than just their backs and their arms.”

Some of Ross’s investments, such as his effort to create a global textile leader, lagged. Others made him a fortune. He sold his steel holdings for $4.5 billion in 2005 to ArcelorMittal (MT), the world’s largest steel and mining company. WL Ross’s profit: $2.5 billion. The chairman personally pocketed $300 million from the deal. That was more like it. Ross sold WL Ross to Invesco, a global investment manager, for $375 million the following year.

Ross assiduously promotes his successes and had little trouble raising $4 billion in 2008 to invest in banks on the heels of the financial crisis. In May 2009, WL Ross, Blackstone Group (BX), Carlyle Group, and Centerbridge Partners bought BankUnited from the FDIC. It was predicted at the time that BankUnited’s failure would cost the agency $4.9 billion. As part of the deal, the FDIC assumed up to 80 percent of BankUnited’s copious losses.

The U.S. was still mired in a recession. The country had spent billions of dollars bailing out the banking system and now private equity speculators such as Ross were scooping up banks, apparently taking advantage of the FDIC’s safeguards. On Oct. 22, Democratic Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island wrote to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, urging them to put curbs on such acquisitions. The FDIC issued rules requiring buyout firms investing in banks to hold them for three years and maintain profit-crimping amounts of capital.

So Ross changed his strategy. He funneled money into troubled banks that needed cash but hadn’t yet fallen into the FDIC’s hands, such as Oregon’s Cascade and New Jersey’s Sun Bancorp. “Their stocks were trading at very, very big discounts from book value,” Ross says. “We felt that provided enough cover we’d be O.K. if they had more losses.”
He also began to indirectly invest in banks that had been seized by the FDIC. In April 2010, WL Ross became the largest investor in First Michigan Bank in Troy. It was a tiny institution with only 30 employees. But First Michigan CEO David Provost had grand ambitions. Banks were failing left and right in Michigan. He wanted to buy them from the FDIC. Provost says Ross understood his strategy immediately and invested $100 million of his firm’s money in First Michigan.
On the day First Michigan announced Ross’s cash infusion, it bought CF Bancorp, a bank in Port Huron, Mich., with 368 employees and $1.3 billion in assets. Its collapse had been the largest in the state. First Michigan, now known as Talmer Bank and Trust, has since bought three more failed banks. Provost aims to create a network of community banks that profit from problems in their larger rivals. It seems to be working. Talmer earned more than $40 million last year. “The Bank of Americas get picketed,” Provost says. “The customers close out their accounts. Then they come over and see us.”

In November, Ross crossed the Atlantic to check on his new investment in the Bank of Ireland. When it was time to leave, CEO Boucher offered Ross a ride to the airport. On the way, they made an unannounced visit to a Bank of Ireland branch in a Dublin suburb. Ross spent nearly an hour at the bank, wandering around and asking questions. “It went down extremely well,” says Boucher. “There was a lot of positive buzz among the employees afterwards.”
For his part, Ross can’t understand why anybody at the Bank of Ireland would be surprised by his interest. “We just put a big chunk of money into it,” he says. “It was kind of under the control of the government. I guess the employees weren’t used to the Prime Minister dropping by.”

There is one banking investment of which Ross is particularly proud. In September his firm pledged $50 million to Amalgamated Bank, which is controlled by unions representing hotel and garment industry workers and has become known as the financial institution guarding the deposits of Occupy Wall Street. On Dec. 8, Ross visits the bank’s art deco headquarters in New York to meet with Edward Grebow, its president. Sitting around a coffee table, the two explain how Ross, a loyal member of the 1 percent, came to be interested in the self-styled bank of the other 99 percent. “Well, the bank, like lots of others, made some bad real estate loans,” Grebow says. “That left us of short of capital.”

He knew there were private equity investors interested in banks. There weren’t many, though, who would put their cash into a bank that is not only union-owned but also has a unionized staff. He could think of only two. One was obvious: Ron Burkle, managing partner of Yucaipa and a major Democratic Party contributor. The other was Ross. Grebow knew Ross had good relationships with labor leaders representing steel and textile workers. “We never had a strike at any of our facilities,” says Ross. “For us, there is nothing strange about having breakfast with a labor leader. We do it all the time.” Together, they agreed to put $100 million in the bank. The deal is awaiting regulatory approval, but Grebow is already talking about using the new funds to create progressive products, such as prepaid credit cards for customers with “uncertain” immigration status and mortgages for city sanitation workers.

Then there are the benefits of being associated with the Occupy Wall Street protests that began in September. Grebow produces a chart showing that 131 new depositors signed up online in October, up from 13 the previous month. The influx of new customers was roughly the same in November. “That’s with no marketing,” he says. Ross listens, quiet as ever. He says he has no problem with Amalgamated Bank’s connection to Occupy Wall Street. It’s clearly good for the bank’s bottom line and therefore his investment. “The bank by its nature is a so-called progressive, liberal bank,” Ross says. “Ed Grebow even marched in one of its demonstrations.”

You won’t see the 74-year-old billionaire accompanying him anytime soon, however. Says Ross, “I myself wouldn’t have anything to do with Occupy Wall Street.” Nevertheless, he’s thinking about putting more money into Amalgamated Bank. Ross may not cotton to protesters who want to share his wealth, but his investments are strictly nonpartisan.